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Arbitrator Behaviour in Asymmetrical 
Adjudication (Part Two): An Examination 
of Hypotheses of Bias in Investment 
Treaty Arbitration
GUS VAN HARTEN*
This article reports on a study of potential systemic bias in the resolution of ambiguous 
legal issues by investment treaty arbitrators. It outlines tentative but significant findings 
that the arbitrators in general tended to favour (1) foreign investors over states overall, (2) 
foreign investors from major Western capital-exporting states over other foreign investors, 
and, albeit based on more limited data, (3) the United States as a respondent state over 
other respondent states. The evidence is derived from an extensive content analysis of the 
arbitrators’ resolution of fourteen legal issues that are contested among arbitrators or in 
secondary literature. The findings clearly support initial expectations of systemic bias 
arising from unique incentives of the arbitrators. Yet the study also has important limitations 
and there is a range of possible explanations for the findings, some not raising concerns 
of inappropriate bias. Broadly, the findings lend support to perceptions that the design of 
investment treaty arbitration does not support fair and independent adjudication of the 
boundaries of sovereign authority and of disputes involving public funds.
Cet article rend compte d’une étude portant sur la possibilité qu’un parti pris systémique 
fausse la résolution de problèmes juridiques ambigus par les arbitres des traités 
d’investissement. Il souligne des conclusions provisoires mais importantes voulant que les 
arbitres tendent généralement à favoriser 1) les investisseurs étrangers par rapport aux 
États, 2) les investisseurs étrangers venant des principaux États occidentaux exportateurs 
de capitaux par rapport aux autres investisseurs étrangers et, quoique fondées sur des 
données plus limitées, 3) les États-Unis comme État défendeur par rapport aux autres États 
défendeurs. La preuve découle d’une analyse étendue du contenu de la résolution par des 
arbitres de quatorze questions juridiques qui font l’objet de contestations entre les arbitres 
ou dans la documentation secondaire. Les conclusions appuient clairement les attentes 
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initiales d’un parti pris systémique découlant des motivations particulières des abrites. 
L’étude présente toutefois d’importantes lacunes et de nombreux facteurs pourraient 
expliquer ses conclusions, certains d’entre eux n’évoquant pas un parti pris inapproprié. Les 
conclusions appuient grosso modo la perception que la conception de l’arbitrage des traités 
d’investissement ne permet pas un jugement équitable et indépendant des frontières des 
autorités souveraines et des disputes portant sur des fonds publics.
INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION, also known as investor-state dispute 
settlement (ISDS), is a uniquely powerful form of international adjudication 
that protects foreign investors from countries. Investment treaty arbitration has 
attracted public attention in recent years as governments in North America and 
Europe have pressed to expand its role, most significantly in proposed trade 
agreements among developed countries. Since the late 1960s and especially in 
the 1990s, investment treaty arbitration has been incorporated into bilateral 
investment treaties (BITs) between a developed and a developing or transition 
country or, alternatively, among developing and transition countries. One 
Western developed country, Canada, has agreed to investment treaty arbitration 
with the United States (in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)).1 
One other agreement, the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT),2 has applied investment 
treaty arbitration among developed countries and it was limited to the energy 
sector. The push to expand investment treaty arbitration in the Europe-US 
1. North American Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of Canada, the Government of 
Mexico and the Government of the United States, 17 December 1992, Can TS 1994 No 2, 32 
ILM 296 (entered into force 1 January 1994) [NAFTA].
2. Energy Charter Treaty, 17 December 1994, 34 ILM 373 (annex I of the Final Act of the 
European Energy Charter Conference) [ECT].
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Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), the Canada-Europe 
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), and the US-led 
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), in particular, signals a turning point in the 
position of investment treaty arbitration. It would establish investment treaty 
arbitration as a near-global institution for regulating and disciplining countries in 
order to protect multinational companies and very wealthy individuals, who are 
the foreign investors that have received by far most of the public compensation 
ordered in investment treaty arbitration. 
Investment treaty arbitration is an exceptional form of adjudication.3 It is 
unique in its use of a for-profit asymmetrical model of adjudication to resolve 
questions about sovereign authority and public compensation for private actors. 
The model is for-profit because arbitrators are appointed and paid by the case 
rather than for a set term with a secure tenure and salary. It is asymmetrical 
because only one class of claimants brings claims against the other. Investment 
treaty arbitration also incorporates the exceptionally powerful remedy of an 
unlimited retrospective damages award against the state, for its sovereign activities, 
that becomes widely enforceable against the state’s assets in other countries with 
limited or no prospect for judicial review. These features are fundamental to the 
design of investment treaty arbitration and they are present in all versions of ISDS 
now proposed by governments for agreements such as the TTIP, CETA, and TPP. 
These features also create a useful context in which to examine hypotheses of bias 
arising from the evident incentives of the arbitrators. 
For the present study, it was expected that arbitrators would favour some 
actors over others due to their interest in re-appointment and in expanding 
the role of the arbitration industry and that this incentive structure might help 
explain arbitrator behaviour. The expectation was tested through the systematic 
coding of fourteen legal issues and how they were resolved by arbitrators in 
situations where the arbitrators faced silence or ambiguity in an investment treaty. 
The hypotheses were that the arbitrators would tend to favour expansive (i.e., 
favouring the claimant investor) over restrictive (i.e., favouring the respondent 
state) resolutions of issues, that this tendency would increase where the claimant 
was from a major capital-exporting state, and that the tendency would decrease 
where the respondent was a major capital-exporting state.
3. For a detailed outline, see Gus Van Harten, Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2007) [Van Harten, Public Law].
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The study is based on a systematic content analysis4 of publicly available 
awards dealing with in 140 known cases under investment treaties. The awards 
were coded for resolutions by arbitrators of a series of jurisdictional and 
substantive legal issues that were contested in existing awards or secondary 
literature. The coded data was used to test three hypotheses developed in advance 
based on the expectations about arbitrator interests arising from the system’s 
unique structure. In this article, the results of the second phase of the project 
are examined. The second phase involved systematic coding—as expansive, 
restrictive, or non-classifiable—of resolutions by arbitrators of seven substantive 
issues. The first phase, reported previously,5 involved coding of seven jurisdictional 
issue resolutions. In that phase, it was found that there was a tendency toward 
expansive resolutions that enhanced the compensatory promise of the system for 
claimants and that this tendency was accentuated where the claimant was from a 
Western capital-exporting state. The latter finding focused on claimants from the 
United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany (although German 
claimants were an apparent exception to the overall tendency for the group) 
and was supported by additional analyses of other Western capital-exporting 
state groupings.
In the second phase of the project, reported here, it was confirmed that the 
arbitrators tended to adopt an expansive approach favouring claimants and that 
the tendency was accentuated for the grouping of US, UK, French, and German 
claimants. Perhaps most notably, it was also found, based on the cumulative 
results of both phases, that there was a reduced tendency toward expansive 
resolutions where the respondent was the United States. This tendency was 
observed in relation to the US experience as a respondent faced with claims by 
Canadian investors under NAFTA. It had not been possible in the first phase of 
the project to test reliably the hypothesis that arbitrators would favour restrictive 
approaches if the respondent was a major Western capital-exporter due to lack 
of data. Finally, it was found that, where an arbitrator was frequently appointed, 
there was an accentuated tendency toward expansive resolutions of jurisdictional 
issues but such a tendency was not found for substantive issues.
These findings in the second phase of the project support the original 
hypotheses of bias, especially in favour of the United States via its nationals 
4. See Mark A Hall & Ronald F Wright, “Systematic Content Analysis of Judicial Opinions” 
(2008) 96:1 Cal L Rev 63.
5. See Gus Van Harten, “Arbitrator Behaviour in Asymmetrical Adjudication: An Empirical 
Study of Investment Treaty Arbitration” (2012) 50:1 Osgoode Hall LJ 211 [Van Harten, 
“Arbitrator Behaviour”].
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acting as claimants and its status as a respondent state. The evidence did not 
prove such bias because in social scientific research there are always other possible 
explanations for findings, i.e., correlation does not mean causation. Even so, it 
was surprising to find significant evidence of the role of claimant nationality 
and respondent identity in predicting the behaviour of arbitrators when they are 
faced with silence or ambiguity in an investment treaty. Because they involve the 
resolution of legal questions, the observed variations in resolutions seem unlikely 
to be explained by some untested factors that may drive case outcomes, such as 
factual differences among cases.6 Whatever the explanation for the results, the 
evidence tentatively supports perceptions that investment treaty arbitration is not 
fair and independent.
I. OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY
In examining hypotheses of bias in investment treaty arbitration, the study 
focused on two sets of actors on whom the arbitrators appear dependent due 
to the institutional context in which they operate: prospective claimants and 
major capital-exporting states. The influence of prospective claimants stems from 
their power to initiate the use of the system in all cases and from the wider role 
of foreign investors (especially major companies) as arbitration users, indirect 
participants in decision making at arbitration bodies such as the International 
Chamber of Commerce, and negotiators of investment contracts containing 
arbitration clauses.7 The influence of major capital-exporting states stems from 
their role in negotiating investor-state arbitration in investment treaties and 
from their relative power in arbitration bodies such as the International Centre 
for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) and the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration, where such states choose or nominate the officials who in turn 
choose the individuals who either (1) arbitrate cases when the parties do not 
agree on an arbitrator or (2) choose who will exercise this case-by-case arbitrator 
appointment power.8
6. See e.g. Brian Leiter, “Rethinking Legal Realism: Toward a Naturalized Jurisprudence” 
(1997) 76:2 Tex L Rev 267 at 269; Jonathan P Kastellec, “The Statistical Analysis of 
Judicial Decisions and Legal Rules with Classification Trees” (2010) 7:2 J Empirical Leg 
Stud 202 at 205-06.
7. See Gus Van Harten, “Investment Treaty Arbitration, Procedural Fairness, and the Rule 
of Law” in Stephan Schill, ed, International Investment Law and Comparative Public Law 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2010) 627 [Van Harten, “Procedural Fairness and the 
Rule of Law”]. 
8. Ibid.
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The expectations informing this study were derived from wider claims about 
perceived or actual bias in investment treaty arbitration. Such claims have been 
made by various commentators who have expressed concern that investment 
treaty arbitration favours foreign investors, corporations, G-8 countries, Western 
countries, or capital-exporting countries, and disfavours governments, the 
public, Third World states, developing countries, capital-importing countries, 
or low- or middle-income countries. For example, De Ly et al argue that a 
pro-investor imbalance arose in the system because investors can bring claims 
against host states but not vice versa;9 Chung argues that developing countries are 
disadvantaged in investor-state arbitration in contrast to industrialized, developed 
nations;10 Stewart raises concerns about pro-Western bias;11 Odumosu refers to 
the number of claims against Third World developing countries as opposed to 
capital exporting states and the industrialized West;12 and Bolivian President Evo 
Morales reportedly claimed bias in ICSID arbitration in favour of transnational 
companies and against governments other than the United States.13 The present 
study is not apposite to all of these claims. It was designed to test expectations 
of suspected bias in favour of foreign investors as claimants and in favour of 
major capital-exporting states, including the United States, as respondents or 
via a state’s nationals acting as claimants. In other words, it was designed to 
test whether arbitrators would favour claimants in general, whether they would 
favour claimants especially when they were associated with a major state, and 
whether they would soften their approach by disfavouring claimants when the 
claim was against a major state (i.e., the United States) despite the arbitrators’ 
apparent incentive to favour claimants in general. 
9. Filip De Ly et al, “Who Wins and Who Loses in Investment Arbitration? Are Investors and 
Host States on a Level Playing Field?” (2005) 6 J World Investment & Trade 59 at 69.
10. Olivia Chung, “The Lopsided International Investment Law Regime and Its Effect on the 
Future of Investor-State Arbitration” (2007) 47:4 Va J Int’l L 953 at 963-66.
11. Ercus Stewart, “Arbitration in the Developing World” (Paper delivered at the Cortina 2008 
CPE Legal Conference, 7 January 2008) at 3, 8, online: <cpeconferences.com/wp-content/
uploads/2013/01/Paper-Stewart-Cortina08.pdf>.
12. Ibironke T Odumosu, “The Antinomies of the (Continued) Relevance of ICSID to the Third 
World” (2007) 8:2 San Diego Int’l LJ 345 at 346-48, 364, 371-72.
13. See “Evo Morales plantea buscar fórmula para neutralizar el CIADI,” El Economista (29 
April 2007), online: <ecoaula.eleconomista.es/empresas-finanzas/noticias/204986/04/07/
Evo-Morales-plantea-buscar-formula-para-neutralizar-el-CIADI.html> (“En estos pleitos 
siempres los ganan las transnacionales nunca ganan los gobiernos. El único gobierno que 
ganó una vez fue el de EE.UU.”).
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The study was based on a systematic content analysis14 of all publicly available 
decisions by investment treaty arbitrators in the 140 known cases under investment 
treaties up until May 2010, when the coding process began. The decisions were 
coded for resolutions by arbitrators of fourteen legal issues that were contested 
in arbitrators’ decisions or secondary literature. The cumulative results for these 
fourteen issues, across a total of 1001 issue resolutions per arbitrator, indicated a 
strong tendency toward resolutions that enhanced the compensatory promise of 
investment treaty arbitration for foreign investors and its financial risks for states. 
This tendency was accentuated where the claimant had the nationality of a major 
Western capital-exporter and was particularly evident where the claim was under 
a bilateral investment treaty (BIT) or the ECT; where the claim involved any 
of eleven of the fourteen issues coded; and, with respect to jurisdictional issues, 
where the claim was resolved by frequently appointed arbitrators. The tendency 
was reduced where the claim was against the United States, although this finding 
was based on a more limited number of issue resolutions and, in all instances, 
involved claims against the United States by Canadian investors under NAFTA.
The study has important limitations. It does not establish evidence of actual 
bias on the part of any individual or in any particular case.15 There is a range 
of possible explanations, some not entailing inappropriate bias, and further 
inferences are needed to connect the observed tendencies to the study’s underlying 
rationales. There are important limitations in the coding process and analytical 
tools and, overall, in the use of quantitative methods to examine potential 
adjudicative bias.16 The number of data points (i.e., discrete issue resolutions) 
and thus the robustness of the findings varied for the different hypotheses. The 
most reliable finding is the new and cumulative one that the observed tendencies 
appear to exist in the coded data, that they apply both to jurisdictional and 
substantive issues, and that they are unlikely to be explained by chance.
14. Hall & Wright, supra note 4.
15. See e.g. Gregory C Sisk & Michael Heise, “Judges and Ideology: Public and Academic 
Debates About Statistical Measures” (2005) 99:2 Nw UL Rev 743 at 794; David E Bloom, 
“Empirical Models of Arbitrator Behavior under Conventional Arbitration” (1986) 68:4 Rev 
Econ & Statistics 578.
16. See e.g. Hall & Wright, supra note 4 at 87-88; Klaus Krippendorff, Content Analysis: 
An Introduction to Its Methodology (Newbury Park, Cal: Sage Publications, 1980) at 22; 
CGG Aitken & F Taroni, “Fundamentals of Statistical Evidence—A Primary for Legal 
Professionals” (2008) 12:3 Int’l J Evidence & Proof 181 at 203.
(2016) 53 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL547
II. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
A more detailed outline of the theoretical basis for the study is provided 
elsewhere.17 In summary, the unconventional structure of investment treaty 
arbitration provides a unique context for testing expectations of adjudicator 
behaviour. The system of investment treaty arbitration is unique because it 
uses arbitration to resolve corporate and individual claims against the state in 
its sovereign capacity.18 In domestic legal systems, such disputes are resolved 
ultimately in courts, not by arbitrators. Conventionally, in international law, the 
use of arbitration to resolve such disputes would be based on a framework of 
reciprocal state-to-state dispute resolution. The same basic reciprocal framework 
applies to the arbitration of commercial disputes. In rare situations where 
individuals can sue states directly in international law, such as at the European 
courts, international courts resolve the disputes.19
Thus, in contrast to other forms of arbitration,20 investment treaty arbitration 
is non-reciprocal because investors can sue sovereign states directly under a treaty 
and cannot themselves be sued (other than in the limited and hypothetical 
circumstances of a permissible counter-claim by a state). Further, the system does 
not employ the usual safeguards of judicial independence otherwise present in 
domestic and international courts, such as secure tenure, an objective means of 
case assignment, and restrictions on outside remuneration by the judge. Instead, 
arbitrators are appointed and paid by the case, assigned to specific cases by the 
parties or by executive officials, and allowed to work on the side as lawyers who 
advise clients that may have an interest in how the treaties are interpreted by 
the arbitrators.21
The broad question in this study was how this unique combination of 
structure and function may affect arbitrator behaviour. The system’s asymmetrical 
structure and absence of conventional institutional safeguards creates apparent 
incentives for arbitrators to favour the class of parties (investors, especially 
deep-pocketed ones) that are able to trigger use of the system and appointment 
of arbitrators.22 Arbitrators may also be influenced by an interest to appease those 
17. Van Harten, “Arbitrator Behaviour,” supra note 5 at 219-21.
18. Ibid at 217.
19. See Van Harten, Public Law, supra note 3, ch 3.
20. See Stewart, supra note 11 at 3.
21. See Van Harten, “Procedural Fairness and the Rule of Law,” supra note 7.
22. Ibid. See e.g. Christopher R Drahozal, “Judicial Incentives and the Appeals Process” (1998) 
51 SMU L Rev 469 at 500, 503; Nudrat Majeed, “Investor-State Disputes and International 
Law: From the Far Side” (2004) 98 Am Soc’y Int’l L Proc 30 at 31.
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with power over arbitrator appointments or with influence over the position of 
the arbitration industry more broadly.23 It is certainly not suggested that these 
expectations are the only possible factors that may influence arbitrator behaviour. 
A range of factors and complex interactions is undoubtedly present in the thought 
process of adjudicators and in the deliberations of a tribunal. Yet the economic 
factors isolated here do reflect issues of rational self-interest and marketability 
that have been identified by commentators as playing a role in arbitration and are 
connected to the suspicions of bias identified earlier.24
The project sought to test three a priori hypotheses.25 The first was that 
investment treaty arbitrators, when exercising their discretion to resolve contested 
legal issues, would tend to adopt expansive resolutions (favouring the claimant 
investor) over restrictive ones (favouring the respondent state). This expectation 
flowed from apparent incentives of arbitrators to encourage claims by signalling 
to prospective claimants that claims are reasonably likely to succeed.26 The second 
and third hypotheses were, respectively, that the expected tendency toward 
expansive approaches would be accentuated in cases brought by claimants from 
a major Western capital-exporting state, represented primarily by the grouping 
of France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States, and that 
the tendency would be lessened in cases against any of those four countries.27 
These hypotheses were based on expectations that arbitrators would be more 
responsive to the interests of major Western capital-exporting states, due to the 
relative influence of these states in institutions that have default power to appoint 
arbitrators and due to their role as the primary drivers of the treaty models on 
which investment treaties are based including their widespread incorporation of 
investor-state arbitration.28
23. Walter Mattli, “Private Justice in a Global Economy: From Litigation to Arbitration” (2001) 
55:4 Int’l Org 919 at 921-22.
24. See e.g. supra notes 1-5; Alan Scott Rau, “Integrity in Private Judging” (1997) 38:2 S Tex L 
Rev 485 at 521-22.
25. For other potential hypotheses identified in the planning of the project, and for an outline 
of my preconceptions on the hypotheses, see Van Harten, “Arbitrator Behaviour,” supra 
note 5 at 224-25.
26. Bernard Trujillo, “Regulating Bankruptcy Abuse: An Empirical Study of Consumer 
Exemptions Cases” (2006) 3:3 J Empirical Leg Stud 561 at 576.
27. On why these states were identified as the primary measure of major Western 
capital-exporters, see Van Harten, “Arbitrator Behaviour,” supra note 5 at 225.
28. Ibid at 216-21.
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III. METHODOLOGY AND ITS LIMITATIONS
Fourteen issues were selected at the outset for coding with the aim of covering 
a reasonable range of contested jurisdictional and substantive issues under the 
treaties that allow investor-state arbitration. They were identified based on a review 
of existing awards (i.e., decisions) and secondary literature, and on consultations 
with outside legal experts.29 The coded issues included seven jurisdictional 
issues in the first phase of the project and seven substantive issues in the second 
phase.30 The combined results for all fourteen issues offered the most robust basis 
for testing the hypotheses. The methodology for identifying contested issues, 
outlining expansive or restrictive resolutions of each issue, and coding the seven 
jurisdictional issues is discussed elsewhere.31 The seven jurisdictional issues and 
their corresponding expansive and restrictive resolutions were:
• Corporate person investor: Should a claim be permissible where 
ownership of the investment extends through a chain of companies 
running from the host to the home state via a third state? Expansive 
approach: yes. Restrictive approach: no. 
• Natural person investor: Should a claim be permissible where 
brought by a natural person (a) against the only state of which the 
person is a citizen, or (b) against a state of which the person is a 
citizen without confirmation of dominant and effective nationality? 
Expansive approach: yes to either of the two questions. Restrictive 
approach: no to either of the two questions.
• Concept of investment: Should the Fedax criteria32 be applied 
to limit the concept of investment under the Convention on the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of 
Other States (ICSID Convention);33 or, regardless of whether under 
the ICSID Convention, should there be a requirement for an actual 
29. Ibid at 228. 
30. A contested issue relating to one substantive standard, most-favoured-nation (MFN) 
treatment, was coded under jurisdictional issues because it related primarily to a tribunal’s 
authority to hear a claim by using MFN treatment to transfer dispute settlement provisions 
from one treaty to another.
31. See Van Harten, “Arbitrator Behaviour,” supra note 5 at 225-27.
32. Fedax NV v Republic of Venezuela (1997), 37 ILM 1378 (International Centre for Settlement 
of Investment Disputes) [Fedax].
33. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other 
States, 18 March 1965, ICSID/15/Rev 1, 4 ILM 524 (entered into force 14 October 1966) 
[ICSID Convention].
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transfer of capital into the host state as a feature of an investment; 
or should the concept of investment be limited to traditional 
categories of ownership? Expansive approach: no to any of the three 
questions. Restrictive approach: yes to any of the three questions. 
• Minority shareholder interests: Should a claim by a minority 
shareholder be allowed where the treaty does not permit claims by 
minority shareholders, such as where the treaty does not include 
the term “shares” in the definition of investment; or should it be 
permitted without limiting the claim to the shareholder’s interest in 
the value and disposition of the shares (as opposed to interests of the 
domestic firm itself )? Expansive approach: yes to either of the two 
questions. Restrictive approach: no to either of the two questions. 
• Permissibility of investment: Should there be an evident onus 
placed on the claimant (or the respondent state) to show that an 
investment was (or was not) affirmatively approved or was (or was 
not) based on corrupt practices? Expansive approach: onus on the 
respondent state. Restrictive approach: onus on the claimant.
• Parallel claims: Should a claim be allowed in the face of a treaty-based 
duty to resort to local remedies that clearly was not satisfied by the 
claimant; a contractually-agreed dispute settlement clause relating 
to the same factual dispute; an actual claim, arising from the same 
factual dispute, via the relevant path of a treaty-based fork-in-road 
clause;34 or an actual claim, arising from the same factual dispute, 
via another treaty that could lead to a damages award in favour of 
the investor? Expansive approach: yes to any of the four questions. 
Restrictive approach: no to any of the four questions. 
• Scope of most-favoured-nation (MFN) treatment: Should the 
concept of MFN treatment be extended to non-substantive 
provisions of other treaties (such as dispute settlement provisions)? 
Expansive approach: yes. Restrictive approach: no. 
The focus in this article is on the cumulative findings and coding of the 
substantive issues, all of which arose from silence or ambiguity in the treaties’ 
relevant provisions. The issues were coded using pre-set guidelines reproduced 
in detail in Appendix I with footnotes to indicate the sources that were used to 
34. A fork-in-the-road clause requires an investor to choose between pursuing one or more paths 
that may be available to adjudicate the dispute with the host state, such as domestic courts 
and investment treaty arbitration.
(2016) 53 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL551
model expansive and restrictive approaches. In summary, the seven substantive 
issues and their corresponding expansive and restrictive resolutions were:35
• National treatment: Can this standard be breached where 
the compared foreign and domestic investors are not in like 
circumstances, where the like circumstances are established based 
only on the existence of a competitive relationship between the 
compared investors, or where there is only limited evidence of de 
facto discrimination or protectionist intent? Expansive approach: 
yes to any of the sub-questions. Restrictive approach: no to any of 
the sub-questions.
• Fair and equitable treatment (FET) (autonomous standard): Is this 
standard autonomous of customary international law? Expansive 
approach: yes. Restrictive approach: no.
• FET (content): Does this standard encompass a novel conception of 
the state’s obligations—indicated by terms such as “idiosyncratic,” 
“unreasonable,” “legitimate expectations,” “stability of the legal 
or business framework,” “affirmative transparency obligations,” 
or breach of another international obligation—beyond the 
conventional Neer and ELSI terminology of “outrage,” “bad faith,” 
“wilful disregard of due process of law,” “wilful neglect of duty,” et 
cetera?36 Expansive approach: yes. Restrictive approach: no. 
• Full protection and security: Does this standard go beyond issues of 
physical security to include issues of legal security or stability of the 
investment climate, or does the standard assign full responsibility to 
the state where a foreign investor suffers physical harm without any 
discussion of a surrounding context of severe longstanding conflict 
in a country? Expansive approach: yes to either sub-question. 
Restrictive approach: no to either sub-question. 
• Indirect expropriation: Is the standard breached based solely or 
primarily on the effect of a measure rather than other potentially 
relevant factors, based on the measure’s effects being a significant or 
substantial taking as opposed to a near-complete taking, or based 
on conceptual severance of the affected property right or economic 
35. The substantive issues were numbered 8 to 14 to distinguish them from the jurisdictional 
issues reported at the beginning of Part III, above.
36. LFH Neer and Pauline Neer (USA) v United Mexican States, (1926) 4 RIAA 60 at 61-62 
[Neer]; Elettronica Sicula SpA (ELSI) (United States of America v Italy), Judgment, [1989] 
ICJ Rep 15 [ELSI].
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interest? Expansive approach: yes to any of the sub-questions. 
Restrictive approach: no to any of the sub-questions. 
• Umbrella clause: Can this standard be violated by private or 
commercial acts in addition to public or sovereign acts of the state? 
Expansive approach: yes. Restrictive approach: no. 
• National security exception: Does this exception exclude emergency 
measures to address a domestic financial and economic crisis? 
Expansive approach: yes. Restrictive approach: no. 
Where an issue was found to have arisen in a tribunal’s award, each arbitrator’s 
resolution of the issue was classified as expansive, restrictive, or non-classifiable. 
The expansive and restrictive approaches for each issue reflected positions that 
enhanced or reduced, respectively, the compensatory promise of the system for 
claimants and the risk of liability for states. Non-classifiable situations included 
resolutions that, as explained in the award, did not fall reasonably within the scope 
of an expansive or restrictive approach in the coding guidelines. Non-classifiable 
situations also included instances in which the claim or argument was withdrawn 
by a party, the tribunal found it unnecessary to resolve the issue, or the issue 
appeared to have been resolved specifically and expressly by the treaty. In the 
latter situation, the resolution of the issue was not coded as expansive or restrictive 
because it was not considered a sufficient exercise of arbitrator discretion.
The primary data source was the text of arbitrators’ awards (and other 
decisions) in all known investment treaty cases decided by 10 May 2010 and 
publicly available by 1 June 2010.37 In summary, descriptive information on 
known cases was initially double-coded, but not blindly, by law student research 
assistants over a three-year period. A more involved coding process was then 
used to determine whether an issue had arisen and, if so, whether its resolution 
appeared expansive or restrictive. Cases were double-coded, although not blindly, 
by a law student research assistant and by the author. One student coded all 
jurisdictional issues in the first phase of the project; a different student coded all 
of the substantive issues in the second phase. In both phases, disagreements over 
37. The coding process is outlined in more detail in Van Harten, “Arbitrator Behaviour,” supra 
note 5 at 225-27. A case was “known” (1) where it was listed on the Investment Treaty 
Arbitration website with an indication that it was brought under an investment treaty; or 
(2) where it was listed as a treaty-based case on any of the websites of ICSID, the Permanent 
Court of Arbitration, the Energy Charter Treaty Secretariat, or the governments of Canada, 
Mexico, or the United States. A case was “publicly-available” where a decision on any 
jurisdictional or substantive issues was posted on the Investment Treaty Arbitration website. 
For the Investment Treaty Arbitration website, see italaw, “Newly Posted Awards, Decisions 
& Materials” (2015), online: <www.italaw.com>.
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coding were resolved on an anonymous basis by a third coder who was a research 
assistant and lawyer familiar with international investment law. All coders were 
urged to form autonomous opinions when making coding decisions.
The methodology for identifying issue resolutions, as summarized here, is 
subject to important limitations. It focused on a sample of jurisdictional and 
substantive issues, meaning that other aspects of arbitrator discretion were 
excluded from the study. The coding could not capture any issues or resolutions 
not outlined in the text of an award.38 The study covered all available cases to 
the date when coding began, yet some materials in known cases were not public 
and, in an unknown number of totally secret cases such as at the International 
Chamber of Commerce’s Court of International Arbitration, it is not possible to 
verify publicly that an investor-state claim was brought and decided by arbitrators 
at all. The study tested expectations at a systemic level—observable in the overall 
decision making of arbitrators—but was not designed to test for actual bias on 
the part of any particular arbitrator.39
For substantive issues, inter-coder reliability among the first and second 
coders was 78.5% on whether an issue had arisen for coding as expansive 
or restrictive and 98.9% on whether the issue resolution should be coded as 
expansive or restrictive (each compared to a random chance of reliability of 50%). 
Even so, coder discretion was integral despite the steps taken to limit it, and 
double-coding was not blind.40 For purposes of transparency and replication, the 
coding guidelines for the project are appended and issue-by-issue coding notes, 
which provided the basis for coding inferences, are publicly available.41
Overall, the study establishes approximate correlations, not firm conclusions.42 
The study identified significant evidence to support the hypotheses, but it is only 
a single study based on a particular method. Perhaps most importantly, although 
incidental to the immediate project, the inherent uncertainty of any study on 
38. Hall and Wright, supra note 4 at 100.
39. Lisa B Bingham, “On Repeat Players, Adhesive Contracts, and the Use of Statistics 
in Judicial Review of Employment Arbitration Awards” (1998) 29:2 McGeorge L 
Rev 223 at 259.
40. See e.g. Hall and Wright, supra note 4 at 109; Michael Evans et al, “Recounting the Courts? 
Applying Automated Content Analysis to Enhance Empirical Legal Research” (2007) 4:4 J 
Empirical Leg Stud 1007 at 1008-09.
41. The coding notes will be posted on the Social Science Research Network under my name 
following publication of this article. See Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc, “Gus Van 
Harten” (2016), online: Social Science Research Network <www.ssrn.com/author=638855>.
42. Matthew Hall, “Randomness Reconsidered: Modeling Random Judicial Assignment in the 
US Courts of Appeals” (2010) 7:3 J Empirical Leg Stud 574 at 574-75.
VAN HARTEN,  ARBITRATOR BEHAVIOUR IN ASYMMETRICAL ADjUDICATION (PART TWO) 554
possible adjudicative bias reinforces the case for safeguards of independence at 
the institutional level to protect against reasonably perceived as well as actual bias.
IV. DATASET
In total, 261 cases were identified as having been decided as of 10 May 2010 
and publicly available in English as of 1 June 2010, when coding for the project 
began. Of these, 174 cases had led to at least one award that dealt with any 
jurisdictional or substantive issues. In 21 of the 174 cases, an award was not 
publicly available. In another eight cases, an award was not available in English. 
Another three cases had been consolidated with another case and were coded 
under the consolidated case. This left 142 cases that could be coded as publicly 
available, English-language awards on jurisdictional or substantive matters 
in known cases that had led at least to an award on jurisdiction by the cut-off 
dates for the study. The cases arose primarily under bilateral investment treaties 
(78%) and secondarily under NAFTA (14%), the ECT (6%), and the ASEAN 
Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments (ASEAN Investment 
Agreement) (1%).43 In twelve of the 142 cases, no jurisdictional or substantive 
issue was found to have arisen, leaving 130 cases in which one or more issues had 
arisen. Of these, there were 123 cases in which at least one issue was resolved 
expansively or restrictively by one or more arbitrators.
The same dataset was used for the coding of substantive and jurisdictional 
issues, although a different range of cases in the dataset proved relevant to each 
type of issue. For the substantive issues, 80 cases were available for content 
analysis, while for the jurisdictional issues, 140 cases were available. This was 
because in 25 cases, jurisdiction was denied to the claimant thus precluding an 
award on any substantive issue and, in another 40 cases, no award on substantive 
issues was available by the cut-off date for the study. Of the 80 cases that could 
be coded for substantive issues, there were 65 in which one or more substantive 
issues arose and, in all of those cases, at least one issue was found to have been 
resolved restrictively or expansively. 
43. An Agreement Among the Governments of Brunei Darussalam, the Republic of Indonesia, 
Malaysia, the Republic of the Philippines, the Republic of Singapore and the Kingdom of Thailand 
for the Promotion and Protection of Investments (ASEAN Agreement for the Promotion and 
Protection of Investments), 15 December 1987, 27 ILM 612 [ASEAN Investment Agreement].
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V. ANALYTICAL MODEL
The analytical model for the study was developed using eight primary measures of 
interest, a dependent variable, and seven covariates used to test the hypotheses.44 
In the statistical model, the primary measures of interest were as follows.
Nationality of claimant. Claimants in the dataset had the nationality of 26 
different states.
Identity of respondent state. There were 47 states among the respondents 
in the dataset.
For these first two measures, the second and third hypotheses were tested 
primarily by isolating France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States as a group, in comparison to all other states. These supplementary 
groupings of states were also analyzed to provide alternative measures of Western 
capital-exporting interests:
• The United Kingdom and the United States versus all others;
• France, Germany, and the United Kingdom versus all others (except 
the United States);
• Historical G-7 members45 versus all others;
• Western European former colonial powers46 versus all others (except 
the United States);
• UN geographic classifications of states in North America, Western 
Europe, Northern Europe, and Southern Europe47 versus all others;
• UN classification of states in Eastern Europe48 versus all others 
(except North America, Western Europe, Northern Europe, and 
Southern Europe);
44. Heather Krause, a statistician and research assistant, conducted the regression analysis and 
was asked to test the data rigorously and avoid assumptions that could skew the analysis 
in favour of the study’s hypotheses. Kelly Goldthorpe, a law student research assistant and 
former statistical analyst, advised on project design and conducted initial data analysis.
45. Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
46. Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and 
the United Kingdom.
47. Albania, Austria, Belgium, Bermuda, Bosnia, Canada, Croatia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, 
France, Germany, Gibraltar, Greece, Greenland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Malta, Monaco, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, 
Serbia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
48. Belarus, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia, 
Slovakia, and Ukraine.
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• OECD members as of 199049 versus all others;
• OECD members as of 200050 versus all others;
• World Bank classification of high-income countries as of 199051 
versus all others; and
• World Bank classification of high-income countries as of 200052 
versus all others.
Importantly, for the third hypothesis involving claims against capital-exporting 
states, the only one of the four major Western capital-exporting states against 
whom claims had been brought was the United States, which was then compared 
to a range of groupings of other states. For this reason, the findings on this third 
hypothesis are statistically relevant only to the United States. They may be relevant 
to other capital-exporting states from a practical or theoretical perspective, but 
not for statistical purposes. The findings of this study provide no basis to predict 
what may happen in claims against those other capital-exporting states. 
Treaty or treaty type. There were four treaties or treaty types represented in 
the data: BITs, NAFTA, the ECT, and the ASEAN Investment Agreement. The 
model excluded the last of these because it arose in only one case. Issue resolutions 
reached under the other three treaties were analyzed cumulatively, with controls 
for variations in treaty or treaty type, except in the case of the third hypothesis. 
For that hypothesis, all of the issue resolutions against the United States arose in 
claims under NAFTA and thus are specific to NAFTA.
Issue type. There were fourteen coded issues in the study. The issues with 
the most resolutions were two jurisdictional issues ((3) Concept of investment, 
and (6) Parallel claims) and two substantive issues ((10) Content of fair and 
equitable treatment, and (12) Content of indirect or regulatory expropriation). 
For these issues, expansive or restrictive resolutions arose in 40 to 50 cases per 
issue. The issues with the fewest resolutions, in 2 to 10 cases each, included 
three jurisdictional issues (natural person investor, permissibility of investment, 
49. Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, 
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
50. Czech Republic, Hungary, Mexico, Poland, Slovakia, South Korea, and all OECD members 
as of 1990 (see ibid).
51. Andorra, Aruba, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Belgium, Bermuda, Brunei, Canada, Cyprus, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greenland, Hong Kong, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, 
Japan, Kuwait, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Qatar, Singapore, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, and 
the United States.
52. Barbados, Cayman Islands, Greece, Guam, Liechtenstein, Malta, Monaco, Portugal, 
Slovenia, and all high income countries as of 1990 (see ibid).
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and scope of umbrella clause) and one substantive issue (essential/national 
security exception).
Count of issues per case. The total number of issues that arose and were 
resolved expansively or restrictively ranged from one to nine issues per case. The 
mean and median were four resolutions per case.
Total appointments per arbitrator. Individual arbitrators in the dataset were 
appointed between one and fourteen times. The mean number of appointments 
was five and the median was three.
Cases. There were 123 cases in which at least one issue was found to have 
been resolved expansively or restrictively.
Arbitrators. There were 204 individuals appointed as arbitrators 
in the 123 cases.
The dependent variable was the issue resolution. A total of 376 issues were 
coded as having been resolved expansively or restrictively across the 123 cases. 
This generated 1001 distinct instances in which an arbitrator resolved an issue. 
Of these, 736 resolutions were expansive and 265 were restrictive.
A generalized linear mixed effects model was used to examine the study’s 
hypotheses.53 The model combined a linear mixed effects model and a general 
linear model. It is similar to a classical general linear model—the best known 
of which is logistic regression—with the addition of random effects to the fixed 
effects already dealt with in classical regression. A generalized linear mixed effects 
model is more flexible and allows for the adaptation of the model to the available 
data and its structure. For example, in the present study, the data was nested 
within both cases and arbitrators. Nested issues will not be independent of each 
other, requiring a model that controls for the resulting correlation. Random 
effects were used to account for this. As a general principle, a model should be as 
simple as possible while representing the data fairly and adequately.
VI. FINDINGS
A. ANTICIPATED TENDENCY IN FAVOUR OF CLAIMANTS
The first hypothesis predicted that arbitrators would tend to adopt an expansive 
approach across all of the coded issues combined. The results supported this 
expectation on a significant basis. Thus, there was a very low likelihood that 
the variation between expansive and restrictive resolutions among all of the 
53. The model was used on the advice of statistician Heather Krause, whose description of the 
model is paraphrased in the remainder of this paragraph.
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coded issues was explained by chance. This finding made it safe to reject the 
null hypothesis that 50% of the resolutions would be expansive and 50% would 
be restrictive.54 Table 1 summarizes the variations in resolutions for all of the 
fourteen issues.
55
TABLE 1: CLASSIFICATION OF ISSUE RESOLUTIONS BY ISSUE
Issue Number of Issue Resolutions
Resolution of Issue
Expansive Restrictive
(1) Corporate person investor 72 85% 15%
(2) Natural person investor 6 0% 100%
(3) Concept of investment 119 70% 30%
(4) Minority shareholder interest 75 92% 8%
(5) Permissibility of investment 27 67% 33%
(6) Parallel claims 162 84% 16%
(7) Scope of MFN treatment 60 50% 50%
(8) National treatment 60 35% 65%
(9)  Fair and equitable treatment 
(autonomous standard) 56 73% 27%
(10)  Fair and equitable treatment 
(content) 137 83% 17%
(11) Full protection and security 51 57% 43%
(12) Indirect expropriation 120 72.5% 27.5%
(13) Umbrella clause 32 91% 9%
(14) National security exception 24 75% 25%
Cumulative 1001 73.5% 26.5%
Across all issues, expansive resolutions were about three times more common 
than restrictive resolutions. This varied modestly between jurisdictional issues 
54. The size of the effect was 0.3, which is a strong effect for a one-sample binomial test.
55. All figures are rounded to the nearest whole. There is a slight variation in the results, as 
previously reported in Van Harten, “Arbitrator Behaviour,” supra note 5, due to these data 
entry corrections to the originally reported data: Issue 6 in Lauder v Czech Republic was 
changed from expansive to non-classifiable for all three arbitrators; issue 3 in Joy Mining v 
Egypt was changed from expansive to restrictive for all three arbitrators; issue 1 in Sedelmayer 
v Russia was changed from restrictive to expansive for arbitrators Magnusson and Wachler 
(but not Zykin, whose resolution remained non-classifiable); and issue 6 in Maffezini v Spain 
was changed from restrictive to non-classifiable for all three arbitrators. 
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(76% expansive) and substantive issues (71% expansive). The tendency in 
favour of an expansive approach was reflected in eleven of fourteen issues, as 
Table 1 indicates. On the scope of MFN treatment, arbitrators were split and, on 
national treatment and natural person investor (albeit with very little data for this 
last issue), they tended toward a restrictive approach. The data was examined for 
whether the overall tendency varied over time. This revealed a greater tendency 
toward expansive resolutions over time, but without any statistically significant 
effect for the combined results or for the isolated results for either jurisdictional 
or substantive issues.
Thus, it is safe to say that the arbitrators favoured an expansive approach 
overall. This supported the hypothesis that the arbitrators would resolve 
contested issues in ways that favoured prospective claimants. Tentatively, these 
results may be connected to the system’s asymmetrical structure in the absence 
of institutional safeguards of independence. Depending on one’s view of how 
the expansive and restrictive approaches were classified, the results may cause 
concern for those expecting the system to deliver evenness in the resolution of 
the coded issues. Respondent states clearly have lost across a range of issues that 
arise often in investment treaty arbitration. That said, the results do not explain 
fully or establish the truth of any expectation of bias. Also, the overall tendency 
did not apply to all issues. Finally, even for the issues that tended most often 
to be resolved expansively, some arbitrators took restrictive approaches. This 
outcome demonstrates that other factors play a role in the exercise of interpretive 
discretion by arbitrators.
B. ANTICIPATED TENDENCY IN FAVOUR OF CLAIMANTS FROM MAJOR 
WESTERN CAPITAL-EXPORTING STATES
The second hypothesis was that the tendency in favour of an expansive approach 
would be accentuated where the claimant was a national of France, Germany, the 
United Kingdom, or the United States as the main Western capital-exporters. 
Additional groupings associated with Western capital-exporting interests were 
also analyzed. After accounting for the control variables in the model, a significant 
relationship was found between the dependent variable (issue resolutions) and 
all other variables operating simultaneously, i.e., the tendency toward expansive 
resolutions by arbitrators was very unlikely to be explained by chance.56 The 
data were also tested for effect sizes, indicating that the model explained 20% of 
56. The model generated an F (F=11.72, 23, 150) that was significantly lower than the critical F 
value, with a p<.001. Table 7 outlines the results of the model and has been appended.
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the variation in issue resolutions as expansive or restrictive.57 This test estimates 
possible inaccuracies in the statistical model; it tends to underestimate rather 
than overestimate the strength of the association between issue resolutions and 
the predictor variables.58 In 1001 issue resolutions over 123 cases, there was 
evidence of a strong tendency in favour of an accentuated expansive approach if 
the claimant was a national of a major Western capital-exporting state. Based on 
the effect of the control variables, this was most apparent where the claim was 
brought under a BIT or the ECT, where it raised any of nine of the coded issues, 
and—to a lesser extent and in the case of the jurisdictional issues only—where 
the issue was resolved by frequently appointed arbitrators.
The overall effect of the variable of primary interest—claimant nationality—
for the main grouping (France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States) was significant (F=5.78, 5, 93; p<.001). This supported the expectation 
that the claimants from these countries would benefit from an expansive resolution 
more often than other claimants. There was a significant likelihood in the case of 
both jurisdictional issues (F=5.78, 5, 93; p<.001) and substantive issues (F=4.14, 
5, 93; p<=.01) that such claimants were more likely to benefit from an expansive 
resolution. Table 2 gives the log odds of each of the five categories of claimant 
nationality being resolved expansively with all other covariates held steady, 
highlighting that the findings for claimants from individual countries typically 
were not statistically significant because they carried a risk of error in excess of 
5%. Figure 1 presents the expected probability of an expansive resolution for each 
claimant nationality in the first grouping with all other covariates held steady.
57. This was tested using the McFadden R-squared statistic and generated an effect size of .20 
overall, indicating that the model explained 20% of the variation in issue resolutions as 
expansive or restrictive. See A Colin Cameron & Frank AG Windmeijer, “An R-squared 
Measure of Goodness of Fit for Some Common Nonlinear Regression Models” (1997) 77:2 J 
Econometrics 329. 
58. Table 8 outlines the change in the McFadden pseudo R-squared attributed to each individual 
predictor in the model and has been appended.
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TABLE 2: EFFECT OF CLAIMAINT NATIONALITY (GROUPING #1) 
ON THE LIKELIHOOD OF AN EXPANSIVE RESOLUTION
Claimant Nationality Probability of Expansive Resolution Statistical Significance
France .66 p=.34
Germany .54 p=.85
United Kingdom .71 p=.05
United States .66 p=.04
All others .56 P=.31
FIGURE 1: PROBABILITY OF AN EXPANSIVE RESOLUTION BY CLAIMANT 
NATIONALITY: OVERALL (ISSUES (1) TO (14))
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TABLE 2: EFFECT OF CLAI AINT NATIONALITY (GROUPING #1) 
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Clai ant Nationality Probability of Expansive Resolution Statistical Significance
France .66 p=.34
Germany .54 p=.85
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All others .56 P=.31
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For jurisdictional and substantive issues, US claimants benefited from an 
accentuated tendency toward expansive resolutions, although they led the field 
only for jurisdictional issues. Thus, only the results for jurisdictional issues 
supported the more detailed expectation that US claimants would enjoy the 
strongest accentuation of an expansive tendency. That said, country-by-country 
results had a higher risk of statistical error and were not always significant. For 
claimants from the United Kingdom and the United States, the country-specific 
results had a 5% and 4% risk of error; for claimants from Germany, France, and 
other states, the risk was 85%, 34%, and 31%, and thus not reliable. There was 
especially limited country-specific data for claimants of Germany and France; of 
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123 cases that generated the issue resolutions, 37 involved a US claimant, eleven 
a UK claimant, six a French claimant, and six a German claimant. 
The findings were tested further by analyzing other groupings of claimant 
nationalities associated with Western capital-exporting interests. The other 
groupings included the United States and the United Kingdom as a group; 
France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States cumulatively (i.e., 
combining all issue resolutions for claimants from these countries); G-7 states; 
Western European former colonial powers; OECD member states; and World 
Bank high-income states. For each of these groupings, the findings supported 
the hypothesis and were statistically significant. Similar tendencies were observed 
for other groupings (US claimants alone; French, German, and UK claimants as 
a group; and UN geographic groupings) but the findings were not significant. 
Table 3 provides a detailed report.
TABLE 3: ANALYSES OF ADDITIONAL GROUPINGS OF CLAIMAINT NATIONALITIES: 
OVERALL (ISSUES (1) TO (14))
Grouping Summary of Results
Grouping #2
Group 2A: The United States (n=359) 
Group 2B: All other states (n=642)
The grouping did not have an overall statisti-
cally significant effect (F=2.75, 1, 153, p=.10). 
Claimants from the United States were 63% 
more likely to benefit from an expansive 
resolution than claimants from all other states 
combined, but the effect was not statistically 
significant because it carried a 10% risk that it 
was explained by chance.
Grouping #3
Group 3A: France, Germany, and the United 
Kingdom (n=181) 
Group 3B: All other states (except the United 
States) (n=461)
The grouping did not have an overall statisti-
cally significant effect (F=3.47, 1, 153, p=.07). 
Claimants from a state in group 3A were 
52% more likely to benefit from an expansive 
resolution than claimants from all other states 
combined except the United States, but the 
effect was not statistically significant because 
it carried a 7% risk that it was explained by 
chance.
Grouping #4
Group 4A: The United Kingdom, the United 
States (n=456) 
Group 4B: All other states (n=545)
The grouping had an overall statistically 
significant effect (F=6.14, 1, 153, p=.01). 
Claimants from the United Kingdom or the 
United States were 68% more likely to benefit 
from an expansive resolution than claimants 
from all other states combined.
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TABLE 3: ANALYSES OF ADDITIONAL GROUPINGS OF CLAIMAINT NATIONALITIES: 
OVERALL (ISSUES (1) TO (14))
Grouping Summary of Results
Grouping #5
Group 5A: France, Germany, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States cumulatively 
(n=558) 
Group 5B: All other states (n=443)
The grouping had an overall statistically 
significant effect (F=5.34, 1, 153, p=.02). 
Claimants from a state in group 5A were 
67% more likely to benefit from an expansive 
resolution than claimants from all other states 
combined.
Grouping #6
Group 6A: Historical G-7 states (n=621)
Group 6B: All other states (n=380)
The grouping had an overall statistically 
significant effect (F=4.44, 1, 153, p=.03). 
Claimants from a state in group 6A were 
46% more likely to benefit from an expansive 
resolution than claimants from all other states 
combined. Notably, there were no cases in 
group 6A involving a claimant from Japan.
Grouping #7
Group 7A: Western European former colonial 
powers (n=187)
Group 7B: All other states (except the United 
States) (n=326)
The grouping had an overall statistically 
significant effect (F=7.22, 1, 153, p=.01). 
Claimants from a state in group 7A were 
48% more likely to benefit from an expansive 
resolution than claimants from all other states 
combined except the United States.
Grouping #8
Group 8A: States in North America, Western 
Europe, Southern Europe, and Northern 
Europe (n=849) 
Group 8B: All other states (n=152)
The grouping did not have an overall statisti-
cally significant effect (F=2.81, 1, 153, p=.10). 
Claimants from states in group 8A were 31% 
more likely to benefit from an expansive 
resolution than claimants from all other states 
combined, but the effect was not statistically 
significant because it carried a 10% risk that 
it was explained by chance. As a descriptive 
finding, 85% of issue resolutions were in cases 
brought by a claimant from a state in group 
8A.
Grouping #9
Group 9A: States in Eastern Europe (n=5)
Group 9B: All others (except states in North 
America, Western Europe, Southern Europe, 
and Northern Europe)
The grouping could not be tested because 
there were only five cases, in group 9A, 
brought by Eastern European claimants.
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TABLE 3: ANALYSES OF ADDITIONAL GROUPINGS OF CLAIMAINT NATIONALITIES: 
OVERALL (ISSUES (1) TO (14))
Grouping Summary of Results
Grouping #10
Group 10A: OECD members as of 1990 
(n=490)
Group 10B: All other states (n=511)
The grouping had an overall statistically 
significant effect (F=6.41, 1, 153, p=.01). 
Claimants from states in group 10A were 
31% more likely to benefit from an expansive 
resolution than claimants from all other states 
combined.
Grouping #11
Group 11A: OECD members as of 2000 
(n=755)
Group 11B: All other states (n=246)
The grouping had an overall statistically 
significant effect (F=12.42, 1, 153, p=.005). 
Claimants from states in group 11A were 
27% more likely to benefit from an expansive 
resolution than claimants from all other states 
combined.
Group #12
Group 12A: High-income states as of 1990 
(n=813) 
Group 12B: All other states (n=188)
The grouping had an overall statistically 
significant effect (F=7.04, 1, 153, p=.008). 
Claimants from states in group 12A were 
23% more likely to benefit from an expansive 
resolution than claimants from all other states 
combined. As a descriptive finding, 81% of 
issues resolutions were in cases brought by a 
claimant from a state in group 12A.
Group #13
Group 13A: High-income states as of 2000 
(n=828) 
Group 13B: All other states (n=173)
The grouping had an overall statistically 
significant effect (F=6.18, 1, 153, p=.01). 
Claimants from states in group 13A were 
22% more likely to benefit from an expansive 
resolution than claimants from all other states 
combined. As a descriptive finding, 83% of 
issues resolutions were in cases brought by a 
claimant from a state in group 13A.
The model controlled for other effects and there was sufficient data to provide 
some findings that involve the effect of other factors on the tendency toward 
an expansive approach and that are incidental to the original hypotheses of the 
study. Perhaps most importantly, it was found that the variable of the specific 
issue—among the fourteen coded issues—accounted significantly for about 8% 
of the overall variation in issue resolutions (F=39.87, 13, 208, p<.001). This 
finding highlighted the importance of focusing on those issues for which there 
were extensive data in any comparison of issue-by-issue results. Figure 2 outlines 
the issue-by-issue coding results across the 1001 issue resolutions.
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FIGURE 2: BREAKDOWN OF ISSUE RESOLUTIONS BY SPECIFIC ISSUE
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FIGURE 2: BREAKDOWN OF ISSUE RESOLUTIONS BY SPECIFIC ISSUE
Importantly, these issue-by-issue results are only descriptive; the predictive 
analysis in the model focused on the overall tendency in the resolution of all 
fourteen issues combined.
The statistical analysis also revealed, incidentally, that variations in issue 
resolutions among the three main treaties or treaty types (BITs, the ECT, and 
NAFTA) had a significant effect on variations in the issue resolutions overall 
(F=10.17, 4, 103, p<.001), with an effect size of 6% (7% for jurisdictional 
issues, though only 2% for substantive issues). Issues arising and resolved under 
NAFTA had the lowest likelihood of being resolved expansively and there were 
no noteworthy differences between BITs and the ECT. Table 4 indicates the 
probabilities for each treaty or treaty type across the fourteen issues, controlling 
for all other variables. Again, these are descriptive findings; they explain what 
happened based on the coded data and should not be taken to predict reliably 
what will happen in the future.
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Importantly, these issue-by-issue results are only descriptive; the predictive 
analysis in the model focused on the overall tendency in the resolution of all 
fourteen issues combined.
The statistical analysis also revealed, incidentally, that variations in issue 
resolutions among the three main treaties or treaty types (BITs, the ECT, and 
NAFTA) had a significant effect on variations in the issue resolutions overall 
(F=10.17, 4, 103, p<.001), with an effect size of 6% (7% for jurisdictional 
issues, though only 2% for substantive issues). Issues arising and resolved under 
NAFTA had the lowest likelihood of being resolved expansively and there were 
no noteworthy differences between BITs and the ECT. Table 4 indicates the 
probabilities for each treaty or treaty type across the fourteen issues, controlling 
for all other variables. Again, these are descriptive findings; they explain what 
happened based on the coded data and should not be taken to predict reliably 
what will happen in the future.
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TABLE 4: EFFECTS OF TREATY OR TREATY TYPE ON THE LIKELIHOOD OF AN 
EXPANSIVE RESOLUTION
Treaty or Treaty Type Probability p-value
Bilateral investment treaty (BIT) .67 .001
Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) .75 .001
North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) .54 .03
Perhaps less importantly, the model indicated, incidentally, that as total issue 
resolutions increased per case, so too did the likelihood that the issues would be 
resolved expansively. However, the effect size of 3% for this variable was relatively 
small, indicating that this was not important by itself as a predictor of issue 
resolutions. It was also found that the frequency of arbitrator appointments 
(measured by the total count of appointments per arbitrator) was a significant 
factor for jurisdictional issues and cumulatively, but with a relatively small effect 
size (3% and 2%, respectively). For the substantive issues, this factor did not have 
a significant effect.
These findings supported the expectation that arbitrators would resolve 
issues differently for foreign investors that are associated with a major Western 
capital-exporter. Overall and for both jurisdictional and substantive issues, all 
of the groupings indicated a tendency toward expansive resolutions for these 
claimants. The strongest finding was that claimants from those states—when they 
bring claims under a BIT or the ECT and raise any of eleven of the coded issues—
are more likely to benefit from an expansive approach. By extension, respondent 
states are at a disadvantage relative to claimants overall but are more likely to 
benefit from a restrictive approach when the claimant is from a state other than a 
major Western capital-exporter, especially if the claim is brought under NAFTA.
What should one make of these results? They may be surprising if one 
anticipated that the resolution of contested legal issues would not vary much 
according to claimant nationality. Indeed, this expectation is a basic proposition 
of impartiality in international adjudication. There are also limitations, however, 
in the case of observed tendencies at a systemic level. While arbitrator incentives 
provided the rationales for the study’s hypotheses, they should not be taken to 
explain the results fully. Other possible explanations that were not tested here 
could include variations in ideological preferences of arbitrators, variations in 
parties’ legal representation, poor appointment decisions by groups of states or 
investors, or variations in the degree to which some cases may influence subsequent 
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interpretations.59 The findings are tentative for these and other reasons. Even so, 
whatever their explanation, the observed tendencies raise questions about the 
fairness of investment treaty arbitration for interests that are not associated with 
major Western capital-exporters. They indicate that suspicions of bias about the 
system do have a tendency that is linked to the arbitrators’ exercise of discretion.
C. ANTICIPATED TENDENCY IN FAVOUR OF THE UNITED STATES
It was hypothesized that the tendency in favour of an expansive approach would 
be lessened where the respondent was France, Germany, the United Kingdom, 
or the United States. However, it emerged that the United States was the only 
country for which there was data on this issue; that is, among the four countries 
initially identified to represent major Western capital-exporting states, only the 
United States was subject to a decision in which the arbitrators resolved coded 
issues. France, Germany, and the United Kingdom had not been the subject of 
such decisions presumably because, unlike the United States, they had (and have) 
not consented to investor-state arbitration in a broad-based investment treaty 
with another developed state. A few cases against France or Germany under the 
ECT came after the cut-off dates for the study. As well, all of the cases against 
the United States were brought by Canadian investors under NAFTA. Thus, 
while there was sufficient data for reliable findings, the more limited dataset 
makes the findings for this hypothesis less robust than the findings for the first 
two hypotheses.
For example, due to limited data, it was not possible to test this hypothesis 
for jurisdictional or substantive issues alone. It was also not possible to isolate 
other potential effects built into the model in order to generate incidental 
findings, as was done for the hypothesis related to claimant nationality. That 
said, the results indicated that the United States was more likely than other 
countries to benefit from a restrictive approach when other variables were held 
steady. On a statistically significant basis, the United States benefited from a 
restrictive approach:
• 60% more often than the other 45 respondent states under 
BITs and the ECT;
59. See e.g. Sisk and Heise, supra note 15 at 746; R Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, “Is the 
Federal Circuit Succeeding? An Empirical Assessment of Judicial Performance” (2004) 
152:3 U Pa L Rev 1105 at 1129; Catherine A Rogers, “The Arrival of the ‘Have-Nots’ 
in International Arbitration” (2007) 8:1 Nev LJ 341 at 357-58; Ole Kristian Fauchald, 
“The Legal Reasoning of ICSID Tribunals—An Empirical Analysis” (2008) 19:2 
EJIL 301 at 337-38.
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• 55% more often than Canada under NAFTA;
• 35% more often than Canada and Mexico, under NAFTA and 
in one BIT case;
• 35% more often than non-high-income respondent states,60 usually 
under BITs and the ECT;
• 37% more often than other OECD states;61 and
• 59% more often than all states other than the Western European 
former colonial powers.62
Table 5 outlines the findings in more detail, comparing the United States 
alone, as a respondent state, to the other groupings of respondent states not 
associated with major Western capital-exporters. Because the data for the United 
States arose from its experience as a respondent state under NAFTA, groupings 
involving the other NAFTA respondent states—Canada and Mexico—
were also examined.
TABLE 5: ANALYSES OF GROUPINGS OF RESPONDENTS: OVERALL 
(ISSUES (1) TO (14)) 
Grouping Summary of results
Grouping #1
Group 1A: The United States (n=45) 
Group 1B: All other states (n=956)
This grouping had an overall statistically 
significant effect (F=21.65,1,153,p<.01). As a 
respondent, the United States was 60% more 
likely to benefit from a restrictive resolution 
than all other states.
Grouping #2
Group 2A: The United States (n=45) 
Group 2B: Canada (n=32)
The grouping had an overall statistically 
significant effect (F=23.16, 1, 153, p<.01). 
The United States was 55% more likely to 
benefit from a restrictive resolution than 
Canada.
Grouping #3
Group 3A: The United States (n=45) 
Group 3B: Canada and Mexico (n=89)
The grouping had an overall statistically 
significant effect (F=20.81, 1, 153, p=.04). 
The United States was 35% more likely to 
benefit from a restrictive resolution than 
Canada and Mexico.
60. See supra notes 51-52.
61. See supra notes 49-50.
62. See supra note 46.
(2016) 53 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL569
TABLE 5: ANALYSES OF GROUPINGS OF RESPONDENTS: OVERALL 
(ISSUES (1) TO (14)) 
Grouping Summary of results
Grouping #4
Group 4A: The United States (n=45) 
Group 4B: All other states except high income 
states as of 1990 and 2000 (n=891)
The grouping had an overall statistically 
significant effect (F=17.47, 1, 153, p<.01). 
The United States was 35% more likely to 
benefit from a restrictive resolution than 
non-high income states.
Grouping #5
Group 5A: The United States (n=45) 
Group 5B: All other OECD states as of 1990 
(n=41)
The grouping did not have an overall statisti-
cally significant effect (F=0.14, 1, 153, p=.89). 
The United States was 65% more likely to 
benefit from a restrictive resolution than other 
OECD states as of 1990, but the effect was 
not statistically significant because it carried an 
89% risk that it was explained by chance.
Grouping #6
Group 6A: The United States (n=45)
Group 6B: All other OECD states as of 2000 
(n=194)
The grouping had an overall statistically 
significant effect (F=17.03, 1, 153, p=.02). 
The United States was 37% more likely to 
benefit from a restrictive resolution than other 
OECD states as of 2000.
Grouping #7
Group 7A: The United States (n=45)
Group 7B: All other states except Western 
European former colonial powers (n=926)
The grouping had an overall statistically 
significant effect (F=21.96, 1, 153, p<.01). 
The United States was 59% more likely to 
benefit from a restrictive resolution than other 
states besides the former Western European 
colonial powers.
Taken together, these findings support the original hypothesis that the 
United States, as a major Western capital exporter, would receive more favourable 
treatment in the resolution of contested legal issues. The findings are limited to 
the United States and did not test the expectation for other countries on any 
statistical basis. Also, the findings emerged only from the United States’ experience 
as a respondent exclusively under NAFTA, meaning that they could be explained 
by an overall more restrictive approach by NAFTA arbitrators as compared to 
BIT and ECT arbitrators. This explanation is contradicted, however, by the 
finding that the United States benefited from restrictive resolutions significantly 
more than Canada, which was also a respondent state only under NAFTA, and 
Mexico, which was a respondent under NAFTA in all but one of the coded cases. 
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Further, the coded issues reflected a range (nine) of the fourteen issues that were 
coded, and those issues arise often at a general level across the treaties and treaty 
types beyond NAFTA. 
In the findings for the different groupings of respondent states, compared to 
the United States, the higher likelihood of a restrictive resolution in cases against 
the United States ranged from 35% to 60%. As an aside, this variation was less 
stark than what one sees in the raw coding results, which indicated a much 
greater tendency toward restrictive resolutions in favour of the United States. The 
difference between the statistical findings and the raw results highlights the role 
of the control variables. By holding such variables steady, the apparent benefit 
enjoyed by the United States was diminished but still significant. Similarly, 
viewed by themselves, the raw results would exaggerate the evidence of a pro-US 
bias. With that caveat in mind, I have reproduced the raw results below to shed 
greater light on the ways in which the United States was found to benefit more 
often from a restrictive approach.
These raw results can be summarized as follows. The fourteen coded issues 
were resolved expansively 6 times and restrictively 39 times in cases against the 
United States. In NAFTA cases against Canada and Mexico, the respective ratios 
were 24 to 8 and 34 to 14. In cases against all other respondent states under all 
treaties and treaty types, the proportion was 730 expansive to 216 restrictive. 
Thus, the proportion of expansive resolutions was 13% for the United States 
in contrast to 75% for Canada, 71% for Mexico, and 77% for all other states. 
Figures 3 and 4 represent these descriptive findings about the raw results. 
FIGURE 3: ISSUE RESOLUTIONS PER ARBITRATOR, BY RESPONDENT STATE
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FIGURE 4: ISSUE RESOLUTIONS PER ARBITRATOR UNDER NAFTA, BY 
RESPONDENT STATE
As a further illustration of the raw results, Table 6 outlines the issue 
resolutions in NAFTA cases against Canada, Mexico, and the United States. I 
have reported the information in this table to provide more background to those 
who are familiar with the doctrine of NAFTA investment law and interested to 
know how the issue resolutions in the coded data were distributed by issue and 
respondent state. Again, I stress that these are not reliable predictive findings 
because they are not based on the statistical model that held control variables 
steady. They do not affect the overall finding of pro-US bias outlined above, 
except to demonstrate how the tendency was based on data drawn from, for 
example, a range of issues under the same treaty. The following is simply a report 
of the raw coding, for transparency.
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have reported the information in this table to provide more background to those 
who are familiar with the doctrine of NAFTA investment law and interested to 
know how the issue resolutions in the coded data were distributed by issue and 
respondent state. Again, I stress that these are not reliable predictive findings 
because they are not based on the statistical model that held control variables 
steady. They do not affect the overall finding of pro-US bias outlined above, 
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As a further illustration of the raw results, Table 6 outlines the issue 
resolutions in NAFTA cases against Canada, Mexico, and the United States. I 
have reported the information in this table to provide more background to those 
who are familiar with the doctrine of NAFTA investment law and interested to 
know how the issue resolutions in the coded data were distributed by issue and 
respondent state. Again, I stress that these are not reliable predictive findings 
because they are not based on the statistical model that held control variables 
steady. They do not affect the overall finding of pro-US bias outlined above, 
except to demonstrate how the tendency was based on data drawn from, for 
example, a range of issues under the same treaty. The following is simply a report 
of the raw coding, for transparency.
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TABLE 6: RAW CODING RESULTS FOR ALL ISSUE RESOLUTIONS UNDER NAFTA
Canada Mexico The United States
Issue 1: Corporate person investor 6 expansive63 3 restrictive64
Issue 2: Natural person investor 3 restrictive65
Issue 3: Concept of investment 6 expansive66 3 restrictive67 6 restrictive68
Issue 4: Minority shareholder interests 6 expansive69
Issue 6: Parallel claims 3 expansive70 3 restrictive71
63. Waste Management, Inc v United Mexican States (2004), 43 ILM 967 at paras 76-77, 85 
(International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes) [Waste Management]; Fireman’s 
Fund Insurance Company v The United Mexican States (2003), 15:6 WTAM 3 at para 5 
(International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes); Fireman’s Fund Insurance 
Company v The United Mexican States (2006), ICSID Case No ARB(AF)/02/01 at paras 
137-38 (International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes).
64. The Loewen Group, Inc and Raymond L Loewen v United States of America (2003), 42 ILM 
811 at paras 220-39 (International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes) [Loewen]
65. Ibid.
66. Pope & Talbot Inc v The Government of Canada (2000), UNCITRAL Rules at para 96 [Pope 
& Talbot #1]; SD Myers, Inc v The Government of Canada (2000), 40 ILM 1408 [SD Myers]. 
For the majority opinion, see ibid at paras 226-31. For Schwartz’s separate opinion, see 
ibid at paras 39-41.
67. Bayview Irrigation District et al v United Mexican States (2007), 19:5 WTAM 5 at 
paras 91, 98-105.
68. Methanex Corporation v United States of America (2005), 44 ILM 1345, at paras 
IV.D.16-IV.D.18 [Methanex]; Canadian Cattleman for Fair Trade v United States of America 
(2008), UNCITRAL Rules at paras 111-12, 193.
69. GAMI Investments, Inc v The Government of the United Mexican States (2004), 44 ILM 545 at 
paras 26-35 [GAMI]; International Thunderbird Gaming Corporation v The United Mexican 
States (2006), 18:2 WTAM 59 at paras 97-110 [International Thunderbird].
70. GAMI, ibid at paras 24-42. 
71. Loewen, supra note 64 at paras 143, 149, 154.
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72. Pope & Talbot Inc v The Government of Canada (2001), 13:4 WTAM 61 at paras 76-78 [Pope 
& Talbot #2]; SD Myers, supra note 66 at paras 250-55; United Parcel Service of America, Inc v 
Government of Canada (2007), UNCITRAL Rules at paras 17, 94-96, 101-02 (International 
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes) [United Parcel Service].
73. Merrill & Ring Forestry LP v The Government of Canada (2010), UNCITRAL Rules at paras 
83, 87-93 (International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes); United Parcel 
Service, supra note 72 at paras 98-101, 117, 135-36, 174-78.
74. International Thunderbird, supra note 69 at paras 2-4, Walde.
75. GAMI, supra note 69 at paras 112, 114-15; Marvin Feldman v Mexico (2002), 42 ILM 
625  at 6-9, 15 (International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes), Blanco 
[Feldman]; International Thunderbird, supra note 74 at paras 180-83.
76. DF Group Inc v United States of America (2003), 15:3 WTAM 55 at paras 157-58 
(International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes) [ADF]; Loewen, supra note 64 
at paras 139-40; Methanex, supra note 68 at paras IV.B.12-IV.B.29.
77. Pope & Talbot #2, supra note 72 at paras 108-18.
78. ADF, supra note 76 at para 183.
79. Pope & Talbot #2, supra note 72 at paras 116, 118; SD Myers, supra note 66. For the majority 
opinion, see ibid at paras 263, 266-68. For Schwartz’s separate opinion, see ibid at para 233.
80. GAMI, supra note 69 at paras 103-04, 107-10; Metalclad Corporation v The United Mexican 
States (2000), 40 ILM 36 at paras 89, 97-101 (International Centre for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes) [Metalclad].
81. Waste Management, supra note 63 at paras 92-93, 98-101; International Thunderbird, supra 
note 69 at paras 194-201.
82. ADF, supra note 76 at para 188; Mondev International Ltd v United States of America (2002), 
42 ILM 85 at paras 113-27 (International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes).
83. Loewen, supra note 64 at paras 132-37; Methanex, supra note 68 at paras IV.C.14-IV.C.25.
TABLE 6: RAW CODING RESULTS FOR ALL ISSUE RESOLUTIONS UNDER NAFTA
Canada Mexico The United States
Issue 8: National treatment 6 expansive72
5 restrictive73
1 expansive74
6 restrictive75
9 restrictive76
Issue 9:  Fair and equitable treatment 
(autonomous standard)
3 expansive77 3 restrictive78
Issue 10:  Fair and equitable treatment 
(content)
6 expansive79 6 expansive80 
5 restrictive81
6 expansive82
6 restrictive83
Issue 12:  Indirect/regulatory 
expropriation
3 expansive84
3 restrictive85
12 expansive86 6 restrictive87
63646566676869707172737475767778798081828384858687
64. 
65. 
66. 
67. 
68. 
69. 
70. 
71. 
72. 
73. 
74. 
75. 
76. 
77. 
78. 
79. 
80. 
81. 
82. 
83. 
84. 
85. 
86. 
87. 
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84. Pope & Talbot #1, supra note 66 at paras 96, 101-02.
85. D Myers, supra note 66. For the majority opinion, see ibid at paras 281, 287. For 
Schwartz’s  separate opinion, see ibid at paras 220-23.
86. Feldman, supra note 75 at paras 100-11, 128-29; Waste Management, supra note 63 at 
paras  143, 155, 160-62, 171-77; Archer Daniels Midland Company and Tate & Lyle 
Ingredients Americas, Inc v The United Mexican States (2007), 146 ILR 439 at paras 240-48 
(International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes); Metalclad, supra note 80 at 
paras 107, 111-12.
87. Methanex, supra note 68 at para IV.D.7; Glamis Gold Ltd v United States of America (2009), 48 
ILM 1035 at paras 354-57, 536 (International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes).
Based on the statistical findings for this hypothesis, it is evident that aspects 
of investment treaty law that may give rise to substantial state liability have been 
applied less rigorously to the United States than to the other NAFTA states under 
NAFTA and, although the comparison is less direct because it involves treaties 
other than NAFTA, to other respondent states. There was no basis to evaluate 
whether this pro-US tendency extended to other major Western capital-exporters. 
However, the pro-US variation in the case of NAFTA claims by Canadian 
investors against the United States, and in favour of US investors that brought 
NAFTA or BIT against other states, suggests tentatively that there is a degree of 
hierarchy among Western capital-exporters themselves.
Reflecting on the original theoretical rationales for the hypotheses for the 
study, the findings provide support for the hypothesis of systemic pro-US bias 
based on the disproportionate power of the United States over the economic 
position of arbitrators and the arbitration industry. They also provide support 
for the expectation that US power in the organizations that exercise default 
appointing authority, and in the negotiation of investment treaties, would affect 
how arbitrators exercise their discretionary power. They also appear relevant to 
the widely known contextual fact, regarding case outcomes, that the United 
States has never lost a NAFTA case. That is, if the arbitrators tend to apply the 
same disciplines more softly to the United States than to other states, it is less 
surprising that the United States rarely (or never) loses cases. However, I stress 
that, like other findings in this study, the results may be explained by a range of 
alternative explanations such as a superior legal capacity of the US government 
or ideological preferences of the arbitrators. 
VII. CONCLUSION
The present study was an attempt to use empirical methods to test specific 
hypotheses of systemic bias arising from larger institutional concerns. It relied 
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on a content analysis of arbitrators’ resolutions of contested legal issues instead 
of other empirical approaches and so offers only one perspective, derived from a 
particular method. In turn, its findings should be taken as tentative.
It was somewhat eye opening, however, to find strong support for the 
anticipated tendency toward an expansive (pro-claimant) approach and, more so, 
for the expected accentuation of this tendency in the case of claimants from the 
four major Western capital-exporting states. The finding of significant support 
for the expected reduced tendency in cases against the United States was also 
eye-opening, though it was less robust because it was based on a smaller amount 
of data and thus more limited to the sample of data that was coded and analyzed.
To put this point in other words, the findings of (1) apparent systemic 
bias in favour of the United States as a respondent state were limited to the 
cumulative results under NAFTA, and primarily to the US-Canadian investor 
relationship, and thus were less robust than those of (2) apparent systemic bias 
in favour of claimants from the United States, the United Kingdom, France, 
and Germany, as a group, across jurisdictional and substantive issues both in 
isolation and cumulatively. Both sets of findings were supported incidentally by 
analyses of other groupings of comparable states, such as G-7 states, Western 
European former colonial powers, OECD members (to represent Western 
capital-exporting states), and the opposites of these three categories (to represent 
other states in the world).
The study is subject to important limitations that I have summarized in 
the introduction and text of this article, and elaborated previously.88 Briefly, 
empirical research cannot resolve issues of possible bias in any particular case. At 
the systemic level, an empirical project should be understood as an attempt to 
falsify discrete expectations (i.e., that arbitrators in general would be influenced by 
their unique and apparent dependencies on prospective claimants and powerful 
states), not to prove or disprove possible bias.89 This study is not, nor will there 
ever be, a final word on whether there is bias in the system.90
Keeping these limitations in mind, the findings provide a perspective on 
how arbitrators are able to, and may in fact, shift the rules according to who is 
suing whom and may even be incented to do so as a result of their unique status 
compared to other adjudicators who decide similar types of disputes. My view 
based on this study is that there is only tentative evidence of the expectations 
88. See Van Harten, “Arbitrator Behaviour,” supra note 5 at 231-33.
89. See Richard Lempert, “Empirical Research for Public Policy: With Examples from Family 
Law” (2008) 5:4 J Empirical Leg Stud 907.
90. See Sisk and Heise, supra note 15 at 794.
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of systemic bias at present, but that this evidence supports the well-established 
doctrinal and theoretical rationales for using institutional safeguards of judicial 
independence, such as secure tenure, a set amount of remuneration not dependent 
on the length or frequency of cases, objective methods of case assignment, and 
prohibitions on issue conflicts and outside counsel work, to reduce the risk of 
actual and perceived bias in adjudication. Such safeguards would help to ensure 
that states, investors, and other affected actors do not have a reasonable basis for 
concern about potential bias.
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APPENDIX I: CODING OF SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
Issue 8 (National treatment): Expansive approach91
Flexible approach to national treatment, indicated by:
(a) the non-application of the requirement for “like circumstances” or “similarly situated” 
investors/investments; or
(b) a broad approach to “like circumstances,” including where it is based on an approach that is 
at least as broad as a competition-based reading (i.e., one that focuses simply on the competitive 
relationship between the compared investors/investments and that does not account for 
differences based on policy considerations such as health or environmental risks arising from the 
economic activity); or
(c) a low evidentiary threshold (e.g., less than a balance of probabilities or its approximate 
equivalent, with no requirement for systemic discrimination beyond individual comparator(s)) 
for a claimant to establish de facto discrimination; and
(d) a low evidentiary threshold to establish protectionist intent as the sole basis for a breach (e.g., 
ambiguous statements by a public officer are potentially justified by other policy objectives that 
provide a non-economic rationale in favour of domestic competitors).
NOTES: An award is non-classifiable where the issue is dealt with expressly and specifically in 
the text of the relevant investment treaty and this forms the basis of the tribunal’s reasoning. 
Where elements of a tribunal’s interpretation fall under both the expansive and restrictive 
categories, they were classifyied as “issue arose, non-classifiable/neutral.”
91. For the cases on which this was modeled, see Occidental Exploration and Production Company 
v The Republic of Ecuador (2004), 17:1 WTAM 165 (London Court of International 
Arbitration) [Occidental] (finding a violation of national treatment, although the compared 
investments were not in like circumstances); Pope & Talbot #2, supra note 72 (adopting a 
competition-based approach to like circumstances, presuming a violation based on initial 
evidence of de facto discrimination subject to broad exceptions, and rejecting a proposed 
requirement for proof of disproportionate disadvantage); Saluka Investments BV (The 
Netherlands) v The Czech Republic (2006), 18:3 WTAM 166 [Saluka] (requiring the state to 
justify any differential treatment).
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APPENDIX I: CODING OF SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
Issue 8 (National treatment): Restrictive approach92
Restrictive approach to national treatment, indicated by:
(a) a strict approach to “like circumstances” or “similarly situated”; or
(b) declining to find like circumstances based solely on a competition-based reading; or
(c) a rigorous evidentiary threshold (e.g., a balance of probabilities or its approximate equivalent, 
or higher, with a requirement for evidence of systemic discrimination beyond individual 
comparator(s)) for a claimant to establish de facto discrimination; or
(d) a requirement of protectionist intent as a condition of breach.
NOTES: An award is non-classifiable where the issue is dealt with expressly and specifically in 
the text of the relevant investment treaty and this forms the basis of the tribunal’s reasoning. 
Where elements of a tribunal’s interpretation fall under both the expansive and restrictive 
categories, they were classified as “issue arose, non-classifiable/ neutral.”
Issue 9 (Fair and equitable treatment—relationship to customary standard):  
Expansive approach93
Broad approach to fair and equitable treatment, indicated by:
(a) establishment as an autonomous standard beyond customary standard.
NOTES: An award is non-classifiable where the issue is dealt with expressly and specifically in 
the text of the relevant investment treaty and this forms the basis of the tribunal’s reasoning. In 
the NAFTA context, where the issue is dealt with by a statement of interpretation of the treaty 
on behalf of the states parties, then this qualifies as non-classifiable (i.e., resolved by treaty).
92. For the cases on which this was modeled, see United Parcel Service, supra note 72 (adopting 
a relatively flexible approach to like circumstances); ADF, supra note 76 (adopting a rigorous 
approach to the investor’s evidentiary burden to establish de facto discrimination).
93. For the cases on which this was modeled, see CMS Gas Transmission Company v The Republic 
of Argentina (2003), 42 ILM 788 (International Centre for Settlement of Investment 
Disputes) [CMS Gas] (equating a broad version of fair and equitable treatment to the 
customary minimum standard); Occidental, supra note 91 (declining to limit fair and 
equitable treatment to the customary standard); Siemens AG v The Argentine Republic 
(2004), 44 ILM 138 (International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes) [Siemens] 
(declining to limit fair and equitable treatment to the customary standard).
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APPENDIX I: CODING OF SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
Issue 9 (Fair and equitable treatment—relationship to customary standard):  
Restrictive approach94
Narrow approach to fair and equitable treatment, indicated by:
(b) limitation to customary standard.
NOTES: An award is non-classifiable where the issue is dealt with expressly and specifically in 
the text of the relevant investment treaty and this forms the basis of the tribunal’s reasoning. In 
the NAFTA context, where the issue is dealt with by a statement of interpretation of the treaty 
on behalf of the states parties, then this qualifies as non-classifiable (i.e., resolved by treaty).
94. For the case on which this was modeled, see Noble Ventures, Inc v Romania (2005), ICSID 
Case No ARB/01/11 (International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes) [Noble 
Ventures] (limiting fair and equitable treatment to the customary standard). 
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APPENDIX I: CODING OF SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
Issue 10 (Fair and equitable treatment—content): Expansive approach95
Restrictive approach to fair and equitable treatment, indicated by:
(a) where limited to a customary standard, the application of a requirement to establish state practice 
and opinio juris as the basis for novel aspects of customary standard; or
(b) whether or not limited to a customary standard, the limitation of the standard to the Neer or 
ELSI terminology and/or rejection or serious containment of novel concepts (e.g., by incorporation of 
a rigorous duty on the claimant to know and evaluate the law of the host state and prospect of legal 
reform, or by the adoption of a deferential position where the host state has an objective basis for the 
decision).
NOTES: The “Neer or ELSI terminology” is that of “outrage,” “bad faith,” “willful disregard of 
due process of law,” “willful neglect of duty,” “an extreme insufficiency of action,” “insufficiency of 
governmental action so far short of international standards that every reasonable and impartial man 
would readily recognize its insufficiency,” or conduct that would “shock or at least surprise a sense of 
judicial propriety.”96
“Novel concepts” are indicated by such terminology as “idiosyncratic,” “unreasonable,” “legitimate 
expectations” (including incorporation of a strict duty of the state to abide by specific undertakings 
as an umbrella-like component of fair and equitable treatment), stability of the legal and business 
framework, affirmative transparency obligations of the host state (without emphasis on the investor’s 
duty to know and evaluate the law and to anticipate possible legal reforms), or breach of another 
international obligation, where the terminology is not limited by a strong statement of the need for 
deference wherever the host state has an objective basis for its decision.
An award is non-classifiable where the issue is dealt with expressly and specifically in the text of the 
relevant investment treaty and this forms the basis of the tribunal’s reasoning.
95. For the cases on which this was modeled, see CMS Gas, supra note 93 (concluding that 
arbitrary or discriminatory treatment in general would violate fair and equitable treatment 
and went beyond the language in Neer, supra note 36, or ELSI, supra note 36; requiring 
stability and predictability; and precluding any need for bad faith in favour of an objective 
assessment of whether legitimate expectations of the foreign investor were met); Occidental, 
supra note 91 (approaching fair and equitable treatment as an objective requirement not 
requiring bad faith and incorporating the concept of legal and business stability); Sempra 
Energy International v Argentine Republic (2005), ICSID Case No ARB/02/16 (International 
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes) [Sempra Energy] (incorporating concepts 
of legal stability and observance of legal obligations); Siemens, supra note 93 (broadening 
the language in Neer, supra note 36, and ELSI, supra note 36; incorporating the concept of 
legitimate expectations; and precluding any requirement for bad faith).
96. For the cases on which this was modeled, see Genin (Alex) and Others v Republic of Estonia 
(2001), 17:2 ICSID Rev 395 (limiting the standard to the language in Neer, supra note 
36, and ELSI, supra note 36); Noble Ventures, supra note 94 (applying the standard in 
ELSI,  supra note 36).
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APPENDIX I: CODING OF SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
Issue 10 (Fair and equitable treatment—content): Restrictive approach97
Restrictive approach to fair and equitable treatment, indicated by:
(a) where limited to a customary standard, the application of a requirement to establish state practice 
and opinio juris as the basis for novel aspects of customary standard; or
(b) whether or not limited to a customary standard, the limitation of the standard to the Neer or 
ELSI terminology and/or rejection or serious containment of novel concepts (e.g., by incorporation of 
a rigorous duty on the claimant to know and evaluate the law of the host state and prospect of legal 
reform, or by the adoption of a deferential position where the host state has an objective basis for the 
decision).
NOTES: The “Neer or ELSI terminology” is that of “outrage,” “bad faith,” “willful disregard of 
due process of law,” “willful neglect of duty,” “an extreme insufficiency of action,” “insufficiency of 
governmental action so far short of international standards that every reasonable and impartial man 
would readily recognize its insufficiency,” or conduct that would “shock or at least surprise a sense of 
judicial propriety.”98
“Novel concepts” are indicated by such terminology as “idiosyncratic,” “unreasonable,” “legitimate 
expectations” (including incorporation of a strict duty of the state to abide by specific undertakings 
as an umbrella-like component of fair and equitable treatment), stability of the legal and business 
framework, affirmative transparency obligations of the host state (without emphasis on the investor’s 
duty to know and evaluate the law and to anticipate possible legal reforms), or breach of another 
international obligation, where the terminology is not limited by a strong statement of the need for 
deference wherever the host state has an objective basis for its decision.
An award is non-classifiable where the issue is dealt with expressly and specifically in the text of the 
relevant investment treaty and this forms the basis of the tribunal’s reasoning.
97. Neer, supra note 36; ELSI, supra note 36.
98. Ibid.
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APPENDIX I: CODING OF SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
Issue 11 (Full protection and security): Expansive approach99
Expansive approach to full protection and security, indicated by:
(a) the expansion beyond issues of physical security of the investor and investment to include 
concepts of legal security and stability of the investment climate; or
(b) the assignment of full responsibility to the host state for physical harm suffered by the 
investor or investment without discussion of severe longstanding conflict in a country that 
provides context for the physical harm suffered.
 
NOTES: An award is non-classifiable where the issue is dealt with expressly and specifically in 
the text of the relevant investment treaty and this forms the basis of the tribunal’s reasoning.
Issue 11 (Full protection and security): Restrictive approach100
Narrow approach to full protection and security, indicated by:
(a) the limitation to issues of physical security; or
(b) the alleviation of the host state’s responsibility for physical harm suffered by the investor 
or investment based on severe longstanding conflict in a country that provides context for the 
physical harm suffered.
NOTES: An award is non-classifiable where the issue is dealt with expressly and specifically in 
the text of the relevant investment treaty and this forms the basis of the tribunal’s reasoning.
99. For the cases on which this was modeled, see CME Republic BV (The Netherlands) v The 
Czech Republic (2001), 14:3 WTAM 109 (extending the standard to security and protection 
of the investment); Ceskoslovenska Obchodni Banka, AS v The Slovak Republic (1999), 17:3 
WTAM 189 (International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes) (finding a breach 
based on the state’s conduct in the interpretation of contractual terms); Azurix Corp v The 
Argentine Republic (2006), ICSID Case No ARB/01/12 (International Centre for Settlement 
of Investment Disputes) (extending the standard beyond protection against physical violence 
to create a state obligation to ensure a secure investment environment).
100. For the cases on which this was modeled, see PSEG Global Inc, The North American Coal 
Corporation, and Konya Ilgin Elektrik Üretim ve Ticaret Limited Sirketi v Republic of Turkey 
(2004), 44 ILM 465 (International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes) (limiting 
the standard to physical safety); Saluka, supra note 91 (limiting the standard to civil strife 
and physical violence); Rumeli Telekom AS and Telsim Mobil Telekomikasyon Hizmetleri AS 
v Republic of Kazakhstan (2008), ICSID Case No ARB/05/16 (International Centre for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes) (limiting the standard to physical integrity without 
extending it to legal or economic security).
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APPENDIX I: CODING OF SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
Issue 12 (Indirect/regulatory expropriation): Expansive approach101
Expansive approach to indirect expropriation, indicated by:
(a) a test for indirect expropriation that focuses exclusively or primarily on the effect of the 
measure on the investor and that ignores or seriously downplays other potentially relevant 
factors, such as the regulatory purpose of measure (even where the measure is non-discrimina-
tory) or a requirement for enrichment of the host state; or
(b) the extension of an effects-based analysis of indirect expropriation to situations in which the 
effect on the investor/investment is “significant” or “substantial,” or otherwise less than a “nearly 
complete taking” of the investment; or
(c) the allowance of an expropriation claim based on severance of the property right or 
economic interest into segments, which are then subjected to a distinctive analysis for 
expropriation.
NOTES: An award is non-classifiable where the issue is dealt with expressly and specifically in 
the text of the relevant investment treaty and this forms the basis of the tribunal’s reasoning.
Issue 12 (Indirect/regulatory expropriation): Restrictive approach102
Restrictive approach to indirect expropriation, indicated by:
(a) a test for indirect expropriation that excludes all measures that are adopted for a legitimate 
public purpose or that applies stringent limiting factors beyond the effect on the investor/
investment, such as a requirement for enrichment by the host state; or
(b) the limitation of an effects-based analysis of indirect expropriation to situations in which the 
effect on the investor/investment is a “nearly complete taking” (or equivalent); or
(c) the refusal to allow an expropriation claim on the basis that it represented an attempt to 
sever the property right or economic interest into segments, which would then be subjected to a 
distinctive analysis for expropriation.
NOTES: An award is non-classifiable where the issue is dealt with expressly and specifically in 
the text of the relevant investment treaty and this forms the basis of the tribunal’s reasoning. 
101. For the cases on which this was modeled, see Metalclad, supra note 80 (adopting 
an effects-based analysis and extending the concept of indirect expropriation to 
non-discriminatory measures passed for a public purpose regardless of specific commitments 
of the state); Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, SA v The United Mexican States (2003), 
43 ILM 133 (International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes) (disregarding 
the government’s intentions and shifting the burden to the state to justify measure as 
proportionate); Biloune and Marine Drive Complex Ltd v Ghana Investments Centre and the 
Government of Ghana (1989), 95 ILR 184 (declining to consider the regulatory aims of the 
state as a factor).
102. For the cases on which this was modeled, see Methanex, supra note 68 (declining to find an 
indirect expropriation where the measure was for a public purpose, non-discriminatory, and 
not in breach of a specific commitment of the state); Olguín (Eudoro Armando) v Republic of 
Paraguay (2001), 18:1 ICSID Rev 143 (International Centre for Settlement of Investment 
Disputes) (declining to find an indirect expropriation arising from a mere omission of the 
state and without enrichment of the state); Lauder (Ronald S) v Czech Republic (2001), 4 
WTAM 35 (requiring enrichment of the respondent state to find a violation).
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Issue 13 (Scope of umbrella clause): Expansive approach103
Expansive approach to umbrella clauses, indicated by: 
(a) an interpretation that the umbrella clause can be violated by private or commercial acts of 
the host state (i.e., any breach of contract).
NOTES: An award is non-classifiable where the issue is dealt with expressly and specifically in 
the text of the relevant investment treaty and this forms the basis of the tribunal’s reasoning.
Issue 13 (Scope of umbrella clause): Restrictive approach104
Restrictive approach to umbrella clauses, indicated by:
(a) a limitation of the umbrella clause to cases of sovereign interference or denial of justice or 
equivalent “public” acts of the host state, without extending to private or commercial acts of the state.
NOTES: An award is non-classifiable where the issue is dealt with expressly and specifically in 
the text of the relevant investment treaty and this forms the basis of the tribunal’s reasoning.
Issue 14 (Essential/national security): Expansive approach105
Narrow approach to essential or national security exception, indicated by:
(a) the exclusion, from the scope of the exception, of emergency measures to address a domestic 
financial and economic crisis.
NOTES: An award is non-classifiable where the issue is dealt with expressly and specifically in 
the text of the relevant investment treaty and this forms the basis of the tribunal’s reasoning.
Issue 14 (Essential/national security): Restrictive approach106
Flexible approach to essential or national security exception, indicated by:
(a) the inclusion, within the scope of the exception, of emergency measures to address a 
domestic financial and economic crisis.
NOTES: An award is non-classifiable where the issue is dealt with expressly and specifically in 
the text of the relevant investment treaty and this forms the basis of the tribunal’s reasoning.
103. For the cases on which this was modeled, see Duke Energy Electroquil Partners & 
Electroquil SA v Republic of Ecuador (2008), 20:6 WTAM 189 (International Centre for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes) (extending the umbrella clause beyond situations of 
sovereign interference).
104. For the cases on which this was modeled, see SGS Société Générale de Surveillance SA v Islamic 
Republic of Pakistan (2003), 42 ILM 1290 (International Centre for Settlement of Investment 
Disputes) (declining to extend the umbrella clause to domestic contractual obligations); 
Impregilo SpA v Islamic Republic of Pakistan (2005), ICSID Case No ARB/03/3 (International 
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes) (concluding that the respondent state could 
only breach the treaty through acts of sovereign authority).
105. For the cases on which this was modeled, see CMS Gas, supra note 93; Sempra Energy, supra 
note 95 (both of which rejecting Argentina’s essential security defence).
106 For the cases on which this was modeled, see Continental Casualty Company v The Argentine 
Republic (2006), ICSID Case No ARB/03/9 (International Centre for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes); LG&E Energy Corp, G&E Capital Corp, and LG&E International, Inc 
v Argentine Republic (2006), 46 ILM 40 (International Centre for Settlement of Investment 
Disputes) (both of which partially allowing Argentina’s essential security defence).
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TABLE 7: REGRESSION RESULTS OF THE MODEL
Coefficients Estimate Std.Error t-value p-value
Intercept 1.20 0.48 2.48 0.01
Claimant nationality:2 0.65 0.69 0.95 0.34
Claimant nationality:3 -0.13 0.70 -0.18 0.86
Claimant nationality:4 1.07 0.54 1.99 0.05
Claimant nationality:5 0.74 0.35 2.10 0.04
Specific issue:2 -26.68 51154.92 0.00 1.00
Specific issue:3 -0.85 0.44 -1.92 0.06
Specific issue:4 -0.32 0.56 -0.57 0.57
Specific issue:5 -1.97 0.59 -3.37 0.00
Specific issue:6 -0.11 0.44 -0.25 0.80
Specific issue:7 -3.07 0.49 -6.23 <.00001
Specific issue:8 -3.52 0.48 -7.31 <.00001
Specific issue:9 -2.60 0.49 -5.30 <.00001
Specific issue:10 -1.00 0.44 -2.27 0.02
Specific issue:11 -4.19 0.50 -8.42 <.00001
Specific issue:12 -2.51 0.43 -5.83 <.00001
Specific issue:13 -0.62 0.64 -0.97 0.33
Specific issue:14 -2.84 0.58 -4.85 <.00001
Treat category:2 0.64 0.64 1.00 0.32
Treat category:3 -0.85 0.43 -1.97 0.05
Treat category:4 -0.76 1.42 -0.54 0.59
Total Issue resolutions 0.29 0.08 3.67 0.00
Total arbitrator appointments 0.08 0.05 1.79 0.07
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TABLE 8: EFFECT SIZES FOR INDIVIDUAL PREDICTORS IN THE MODEL
Individual Predictor
Dataset 
jurisdictional 
issues
Dataset
substantive 
issues
Dataset
cumulative
Claimant’s state of nationality 0.08 0.08 0.09
Specific issue among coded issues 0.08 0.06 0.06
Category of treaty or treaty type 0.07 0.06 0.06
Total issue resolutions in the case 0.02 0.03 0.03
Total appointments per arbitrator 0.03 0.00 0.02
